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The dynamics of depoliticisation in urban governance: introducing a 
directly elected mayor 
 
 
Abstract  
Within the context of debates regarding depoliticisation, this article considers how the introduction 
of a directly elected mayor system of governance impacts on urban politics. Directly elected mayors 
are now a fundamental feature of many political systems. They have been widely introduced as a 
reform to improve processes of local democracy and the effectiveness of governing practices to 
offer a more potent form of city leadership. This article focuses on developments in England, by 
presenting the case of Bristol, a city epitomising many aspects of modern neo-liberalised urban 
development. Bristol adopted a mayoral system in 2012 and the article presents empirical data from 
before and after this reform pertaining to two frameworks to understand city leadership. We 
conclude that the move to mayoral governance, in Bristol in the 2012-16 period, eroded the 
influence of party politics and led to the adoption of elements of a leadership style associated with a 
depoliticisation of urban politics in the city.  Nevertheless, the analysis suggests that the mayoral 
model also provides significant space for the expansion of political agency on the part of the city 
leader, not least because power becomes concentrated in the mayoral position.       
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Introduction 
In this article we seek to enhance understanding of the nature of the directly elected mayor model 
of city leadership, and assess the impact of introducing such a model on the governance of a city. In 
doing so we contribute to the debate about reforming and strengthening place-based leadership 
(Barber, 2013; Gash and Sims, 2012; Hambleton, 2015). Furthermore, we aim to connect this 
discussion to recent, and arguably more fundamental, debates concerning depoliticisation. The 
central research question addressed here is: How does the introduction of a directly elected mayor 
affect the (de)politicisation of urban governance?   
Directly elected mayors have been introduced into England relatively recently. The first was the 
Mayor of London (Travers, 2004), who took office when the Greater London Authority was created 
in 2000. The Labour Government of the day pushed for their introduction across local government as 
part of their ‘modernising’ agenda. The old ‘committee system’ was characterised as being slow, 
giving too much power to party groups ‘behind closed doors’ (DETR, 1998: 18), thus shielding 
decision-makers from public scrutiny. It was also criticised for lacking visible leadership and clearly 
identifiable leaders. Reforms to abolish the committee system were included in the Local 
Government Act 2000 and were based on separating executive councillors from ordinary 
‘backbench’ councillors. New models of decision-making in local government, that were purported 
to be more efficient, transparent, and accountable, included options for directly elected mayors. Yet 
many in local government, especially local councillors, resisted their introduction, and their spread 
was slow (Fenwick and Elcock, 2014). Nevertheless, directly elected mayors have remained on the 
agenda for successive central UK governments since then.  The Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
coalition government, elected in 2010, attempted to trigger the adoption of directly elected mayors 
in large cities by passing the Localism Act 2011. It required referendums in ten of the largest of the 
England’s local authorities, on the basis that the mayoral model supported ‘democratically 
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accountable strong leadership’ (DCLG, 2011: 6). In the event, Bristol was the only city to adopt a 
mayor this way (Hambleton and Sweeting, 2014).  
In other countries, such as the US, directly elected mayors are a well-established part of the political 
system (Svara, 2017). In several Eastern European countries, their presence can be linked to (post-
communist) democratisation (Gendzwill, and Swianiewicz, 2017). In England, however, perhaps in 
part as a result of their relative scarcity, directly elected mayors continue to divide opinion in 
relation to their impacts on the local democratic process. They are promoted by central government 
as powerful political figures that can democratise and invigorate local politics, whereas locally, they 
are often seen as disempowering political parties and councillors who support the same democratic 
process.  It is in this context that we aim to develop some fresh insights on these reforms, as 
implemented in England, by considering them in relation to the concept of depoliticisation. To what 
extent and in what ways does the introduction of a directly elected mayor model of governance 
depoliticise the urban politics of a city?   
This article examines the radical changes in governance that have taken place in Bristol, UK, and 
offers a broadly resonant contribution for the following reasons. First, directly elected mayors are 
often advocated as a way of enhancing the effectiveness of city leadership. The number of countries 
and cities that have introduced directly elected mayors has increased markedly in the last thirty 
years or so. (Sweeting, 2017; Stren and Friendly, 2018). The first six ‘metro mayors’ were elected in 
England in May 2017 (Centre for Cities, 2017), with another elected in May 2018 for the Sheffield 
City Region Combined Authority.  Second, the literature relating to the post-political city has been 
criticised for being ‘dominated by theoretical assertion, lacking in empirical research’ (Beveridge and 
Koch 2017: 37). This article makes a contribution to filling this gap by providing an empirical account 
of governance change. Third, Bristol is emblematic of the modern, international entrepreneurial city.  
For example, Bristol is often cited as the only large UK city outside London with an above average 
GDP (see e.g. GVA, 2014: 4), and can lay claim to being the UK’s ‘smartest city’ (Woods et al, 2017). 
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Bristol is one of the Rockefeller Foundation 100 ‘Resilient Cities’, was European Green Capital in 
2015, hosted the international summit of the Global Parliament of Mayors in October 2018, and has 
established a reputation for innovation and creativity. 
The article proceeds as follows. First, we introduce the analysis by referring to debates about 
‘depoliticisation’ and connect this literature to the introduction of directly elected mayors. Second, 
we discuss our approach to assessing city leadership, and operationalise ‘facilitative’ and ‘task-
based’ models for understanding place-based leadership. Following a rationale for our research 
methods, we then offer an analysis of city leadership change in Bristol in the 2012-2016 period. A 
final section sets out our main conclusions, which we link to debates about depoliticisation, the post-
political city, and the scope for local political agency. 
 
Depoliticisation, the city, and directly elected mayors 
The broad, nuanced, and radical literature on depoliticisation and the post-political city has grown 
out of debates around ‘post democracy’ (Crouch, 2004) and the ‘post-political’ (Mouffe, 2005) and 
has several strands. In one perspective, depoliticisation is defined as ‘the denial of political 
contingency and the transfer of functions away from elected politicians’ (Flinders and Wood 2014: 
135). Some obvious institutional examples include the creation of expert committees in various 
sectors that take decisions that might otherwise be made by elected politicians (Flinders and Buller, 
2006). Other more subtle, and perhaps more insidious strategies appear to distance state actors 
from contentious aspects of governing, by moving decision-making to other arenas that 
‘paradoxically enhance political control’ (Burnham, 2014: 189). In the urban politics seam of this 
literature (e.g. Swyngedouw 2017; Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014) the post-political city is one 
where the imperatives of neo-liberal global capitalism oblige cities to be creative, entrepreneurial, 
and above all competitive in the global market. Keynesian-style notions of public welfare and 
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redistribution are discarded as pro-growth policies come to dominate (Macleod, 2011). Similarly, old 
style, class-based adversarial politics is marginalised in favour of a pragmatic style of symbolic 
governance entailing ‘technologies of governing that fuse around consensus, agreement, and 
technocratic management’ (Swyngedouw, 2007: 58).  The visible institutions of democracy still exist, 
but there is a sense that they become enfeebled merely acting as façade that conceals from public 
view important actors and processes and the actual exercise of political power. 
At first sight it might seem odd to link directly elected mayors to depoliticisation. In many countries 
in Eastern Europe, directly elected mayors were introduced, following the collapse of communism, 
as a key part of an effort to strengthen democracy (Gendzwill and Swianiewicz, 2017). After all, the 
essence of the model is that it prioritises political leadership (Mouritzen and Svara, 2002). In 
Germany, a key part of the debate around their introduction has centred on the belief that they can 
strengthen accountability by giving citizens the choice of a politically significant figure (Wollmann, 
2004). The creation of the Greater London Authority in 2000, which included a directly elected 
mayor, was presented as an arrangement that would, by introducing a powerful figurehead, 
strengthen the democratic governance of the capital (Travers, 2004).  The development of 
leadership capacity through direct election has been a theme in Germany (Eckersley and Timm-
Arnold, 2014) and Australia (Sansom, 2014). Supporters of the model believe, then, that directly 
elected mayors can reinvigorate local politics. Citizens choose directly the political leader, perhaps 
one who might not have emerged through traditional party processes (Copus, 2006). Drawing on a 
personal mandate and a secure term of office, a directly elected, and highly visible, mayor can, so 
the argument goes, develop a more outward-looking approach and take ‘tough’, long-term decisions 
for the benefit of the city as a whole that politicians elected in other ways might find more difficult 
(Gash and Sims, 2012). 
In the UK, the mayoral model is seen as controversial, at least in local government (Bochel and 
Bochel, 2010), and has met with resistance (Latham, 2017). Notwithstanding the concerns expressed 
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by many local government politicians central government has taken the view that the creation of a 
powerful leadership figures in city politics would be beneficial. For example, in the Plain English 
Guide to the Localism Act 2011, it was argued that: ‘the mayor would be able to focus on long-term 
strategic decisions - such as bringing together different agencies to make public services work better, 
and attracting jobs and investment to the city.’ (Department of Communities and Local Government, 
2011: 6). Mayors are considered doers and deal-makers, with the visibility and legitimacy to energise 
urban politics inside and outside city hall (Sweeting, 2017). In short, as the epitome of representative 
democracy, they can exercise considerable political agency. 
Yet there are enough indications in the debates around mayors, as viewed through the lens of 
depoliticisation, to suggest that their introduction can be interpreted as part of a trajectory towards 
the ‘post-political city’. The most obvious signal is that a link is often made between mayors, 
economic growth and business friendliness – a sure sign of an effort to prioritise a particular set of 
economic imperatives that set expectations for mayoral governance. Despite there being no 
convincing empirical evidence that cities with directly elected mayors fare economically any better 
than those without (Tomaney et al, undated), the claim is often made that they can. For example, 
the UK Government claimed ‘Directly elected mayors across the country, including in the North, will 
be well placed to make their areas attractive places for businesses to locate’ (HM Government 2016: 
19).  
Another sign of depoliticisation is the notion that mayors can and should use ‘soft’, not ‘hard’, power 
(Sims, 2011). Rather than endow leaders with tax-raising or law-making powers – which might blight 
the landscape for prospective inward investors - these sorts of powers are restricted. Instead mayors 
are urged to use their position to cajole, negotiate, and persuade a variety of other actors to sign up 
to a vision, to agree to be part of a consensus, in an inclusive political process which contains various 
actors from the public sector, civil society and the private sector. Mayors therefore lead by 
‘facilitating’ in governance, not directing (Greasley and Stoker, 2008; Svara, 2009). This style sits 
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alongside the prospect of a slicker and smoother set of decision-making arrangements, away from 
the messier, more cumbersome and confrontational arrangements involving parties and councillors 
(Copus, 2006). Also, mayoral governance prioritises the involvement of professional politicians over 
ordinary citizens (Latham, 2017). As Fenwick and Elcock note, mayoral systems ‘offered the 
opportunity to cut through the lengthy processes of local democratic institutions by providing 
streamlined high-profile leadership’ (2014: 581).  
Moreover, the depoliticisation of local government in the UK is well-established. Various reforms in 
the period since the 1980s have limited discretion in local politics (Stewart, 2014). English local 
government is becoming ‘super-centralised’ (Hambleton, 2017), with ever more limited scope for 
local action. There have also long been concerns over ‘managerialism’ in urban governance - the 
importance of unelected ‘gatekeepers’ in the urban setting who were important in channelling 
urban resources, and enabling some choices, while constraining others for urban residents (Pahl, 
1970). Pahl’s prescient analysis focused on actor from within, and, crucially beyond, the public 
sector, and was ‘well ahead of its time’ (Forrest and Wissink 2016: 4). While the city of the 1970s is 
very different from the city of today, there remain enduring questions around the ways in which the 
broader array of actors coalesce and intersect to shape city governance.  
In the 1990s, as local government became local governance, similar concerns emerged around the 
creation of a ‘new magistracy’ (Stewart, 1996) of unelected actors. Latterly, debates around network 
governance indicate contemporary interest in the ways in which an array of actors within, around, 
and beyond the traditional public sector are autonomous, and contribute to public governance 
(Sorensen, 2016). For this article, the point of interest in these debates is the ways in which non-
elected actors may become more influential when a mayoral system of governance is introduced.  
Our suggestion is that if non-elected figures become more influential this would point to a 
depoliticisation of urban governance. 
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Researching urban political leadership  
There is a considerable body of literature on local political leadership in England, especially since the 
passing of the Local Government Act 2000, which required the formation of legally recognised 
executives in local government (see e.g. Copus 2004 Copus, 2006; Fenwick and Elcock, 2014; Leach 
and Copus, 2004; Lowndes and Leach, 2004; Sweeting, 2017). The frameworks of Leach and Wilson 
(2002) and Greasley and Stoker (2008) take into account these reforms, are specific enough to guide 
the empirical research that we undertook. Both perspectives draw on the American urban political 
science literature for inspiration: Kotter and Lawrence (1974) in the case of Leach and Wilson; and 
Svara (1994; 2003) for Greasley and Stoker.  The Greasley and Stoker (2008) model describes aspects 
of a facilitative leadership style, and we refer to it as the facilitative model.  The Leach and Wilson 
(2002) model sets out local political leadership tasks, and we refer to it as the task-based model. 
Both are helpful contributions for understanding city leadership. The main characteristics of each 
framework are presented in table 1. 
 
The facilitative model emerged from a consideration of the leadership exercised by directly elected 
mayors in council-manager cities in the US. These mayors, lacking executive powers and direct 
control over resources, promote ‘coordination and communication… strengthen teamwork on the 
council … [and] build networks beyond the government’ in their exercise of leadership (Svara 2017: 
107).  Facilitative leadership centres on the ability of the individual leader to exercise influence in 
collaborative relationships (Svara, 2009).  In the UK context, given the fragmented nature of urban 
governance and the expectations placed on leaders to be active in governance networks, it can be 
applied to local political leadership in the UK as well, and Greasley and Stoker (2008) argued that 
English directly elected mayors are more likely to be able to adopt a facilitative leadership style than 
those selected by councillors in the traditional fashion. 
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We have distilled the core and essence of the facilitative approach from three contributions of Svara 
(1994; 2003; 2009) and Greasley and Stoker (2008). Our perspective sees leadership of this sort 
entailing four inter-related and overlapping features: profile and decision-making, low partisanship, 
agreement-seeking, and working in partnership and exercising influence. A facilitative leader in the 
urban setting works in partnership with other local actors and interests. Rather than seeking to 
dominate and control, they seek to support and empower. Facilitative leaders engage with and 
include citizens, civic leaders, other politicians, community groups, and local institutions in decision-
making; they seek agreement and construct a broadly supported set of goals, plan of action, or 
vision; and using their visibility and maintaining an accessible style, and keeping party labels and 
party politics in the background, they can work around, between, and beyond the formal boundaries 
and divides of urban politics in order to exercise influence over other actors. 
 
Alternatively, the task-based model was developed more specifically for analysing local political 
leadership in the UK context. Embedded in it are more traditional and long-standing notions of 
municipal leadership that emphasise party and leading a municipal bureaucracy. The model centres 
on the four functions of: maintaining the cohesion of the administration, developing strategic policy 
direction, representing the authority in the external world, and ensuring task accomplishment.  
Leach and Wilson (2002) argued that the emphasis on different leadership tasks is likely to change 
with different leadership forms, with directly elected mayors being less interested in maintaining 
administrative cohesion than traditional local authority leaders, but more interested in external 
relationships and networking.   
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Table 1: Two perspectives on local political leadership in the UK 
 
Facilitative model Task-based model 
 
Profile and decision-making 
• High profile 
• Makes quick decisions 
• Accessible  
 
Low partisanship 
• Party identity kept in background 
• Party politics low profile 
 
Agreement seeking 
• Seeks agreement between diverse set of 
actors 
• Broadly supported agenda 
 
Working in partnership and exercising influence 
• Ability to work with interests within and 
beyond city hall 
• Supportive of other actors  
• Attempts to influence decision making of 
other actors, including business interests 
 
 
Maintaining the cohesion of the 
administration 
• Preserving support of party or 
parties 
• Forming productive relations with 
officers 
 
Developing strategic policy direction  
• Responding to central government 
initiatives 
• Setting priorities for the local 
authority 
 
Representing the authority in the external 
world 
• Maintaining a positive media profile 
• Safeguarding the interests of the 
authority in governance networks 
 
Ensuring task accomplishment 
• Delivering election commitments 
• Overseeing implementation 
 
 
Clearly, the facilitative model is more in line with the thrust of depoliticised governance, outlined 
earlier, than the task-based model. While the task-based model is based in party-based municipal 
governing, the facilitative model emphasises the sort of streamlined and consensual decision-making 
style that attempts to align with a broad range of interests, one that downplays adversarial politics. 
We argue that using these models as heuristic devices, it is possible to detect a trend towards post-
political governing. Following the introduction of the mayoral system within a given city, we might 
expect that leadership will align more with the facilitative model. 
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Research methods 
 
The empirical research on which this article is based rests on a case study of leadership change in the 
city of Bristol. We use this as critical case (Yin, 2003) that enables us to track perceptions of 
leadership before and after the introduction of a mayor. As with other city case studies (e.g. Ponzini 
and Rossi, 2010), we are able to relate findings to much broader trends  
The project from which this article has emerged has included citizen surveys, surveys of governance 
actors, focus groups, workshops, and interviews. In this article, we focus on the surveys of 
governance actors, and the interviews and focus groups we conducted with them. While we focus 
on the practice of urban political leadership as exercised by directly elected mayors, we do not 
assume that these figures are the only civic leaders in cities. Rather, we argue that urban civic 
leadership is dispersed (Hambleton, 2015). In order to capture the diversity of interests in urban 
governance, and also to get some purchase on the different perspectives that different sorts of 
actors hold, we divide governance into three realms of civic leadership, broadly covering elected 
actors, non-elected state actors, and actors from outside the state (Hambleton and Sweeting, 2014). 
Hence, we are moving beyond the purely political world of elected councillors, and into the space of 
urban managers of Pahl (1970) and other arenas in the city. Such a sectoral approach rests on the 
significance of different sorts of position actors occupy, and the different sorts of roles, expertise, 
and legitimacy that they have.   
The political leadership realm contains people elected by the citizenry and includes directly elected 
mayors, elected local councillors, and Members of Parliament. The public managerial realm contains 
public servants appointed by local authorities, central government and other public organisations to 
plan and manage public services. The non-state leaders realm contains a diverse range of community 
activists, business leaders, social entrepreneurs, trade union leaders, voluntary sector leaders, 
religious leaders so on. Such a classification is broad brush, and represents a simplification of a more 
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complex reality; the three realms will vary by locality and shift over time; they overlap and could be 
further subdivided, and individuals can occupy more than one realm. What the classification does 
do, however, is provide a helpful way of framing discussion about civic leadership within the context 
of a multi-actor system of governance that is based on contributions from leaders across the urban 
spectrum, and we divide our survey results accordingly. 
We surveyed actors from the three realms of civic leadership before and after the introduction of 
the mayoral system, in September 2012 and over two years later, twenty three months after the 
introduction of the system, in December 2014, allowing enough time for perceptions of the new 
system to form. Where possible our survey was sent to the same people, though some of the 
original respondents had moved on by the time of the second survey, and were replaced with similar 
respondents. The survey was sent using a web-based system to: all 70 councillors on Bristol City 
Council (the political leadership realm); 35 Bristol City Council officers, and 35 other public sector 
managers (the public managerial realm); and 35 people each from on the one hand Bristol’s business 
sector, and on the other 35 from across the ‘third sector’ of voluntary and community sector 
representatives (the non-state leaders’ realm). It received response rates of 59% to the first survey, 
and 49% to the second1. 
The questions in the survey were designed to test aspects of the two frameworks for understanding 
urban political leadership presented above – the task-based model and the facilitative model.  Each 
statement was ranked on a five-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The questions 
were adjusted according to whether the survey was sent before or after the introduction of the 
mayoral system, with ‘directly elected mayor’ replacing ‘leader’ in the latter survey. The data was 
subject to testing, and we report statistical significance as anything at the 5% confidence level or 
                                                          
1 The responses by realm were: political realm 61% (2012), 46% (2014); public managerial realm 50% 
(2012), 50% (2014); non-state leaders realm 59% (2012); 49% (2014). 
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better, and divide our results according to realms of leadership in order to assess the different 
perspectives on the impact that of this change.  
 
There are, as with any survey, issues around how respondents interpret questions, and how familiar 
respondents are with the issues presented to them. There are also wider considerations that are 
difficult to allow for with a survey instrument. In 2012, as well as changing the form of leadership, 
from leader and cabinet to directly elected mayor, the mayoral election brought about a change in 
personnel. George Ferguson, Bristol’s first directly elected mayor, was independent, and replaced 
the previous Liberal Democrat council leader, and this independence has coloured the results, as 
discussed below.  Also the change in leadership arrangements coincided with the onset of austerity 
urbanism in the UK (Meegan, Kennett, Jones and Croft, 2014). Central government has, in recent 
years, imposed massive public spending cuts on local authorities, and Mayor Ferguson, as well as the 
current mayor, Marvin Rees, have been forced to deliver drastic cuts in services that are not of their 
own making. We don’t claim that our survey is sensitive enough to be able to throw light on the 
impact of all these variables. We do, however, believe that the survey results provide reliable 
enough data to enable insights to be drawn in relation to understanding leadership change. In order 
to give a richer feel for the nature of the governance change, we also draw on qualitative data 
collected from interviews and focus groups, also conducted before and after the move to mayoral 
governance. These took place with different actors in Bristol across the three realms outlined above.  
 
Analysing leadership change in Bristol 
In this section, after briefly introducing the city of Bristol and placing it in broader context, and 
describing the events that led to the adoption of a mayoral system there, we present the results 
from our surveys relating to the facilitative and task-based models of leadership respectively, shown 
in Tables 2 and 3, supported by quotations from our interviews and focus groups.  
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In the UK, national political parties are heavily involved in local government, with well over 90% of 
UK local councillors belonging to a political party (Razin, 2013), and the country is amongst those 
with the most nationalised local political systems in Europe. Though the significance of national 
parties at the local level may not be as strong in some other countries (Copus et al, 2016), they are a 
major feature of the standard operating practices of most councils, and our case of Bristol is typical 
in that respect. Bristol is a city in the south west of England governed by a unitary local authority, 
Bristol City Council, and containing about 442,000 inhabitants, with 70 councillors from Labour, 
Liberal-Democrat, Conservative, and Green parties. The Localism Act 2011 required the twelve 
largest cities in England to hold referendums on whether or not to adopt a directly elected mayor 
(Fenwick and Elcock 2014).  In the event, ten referendums were held in May 2012 as two cities - 
Liverpool and Salford - opted for mayoral governance under existing legislation. In all ten 
referendums local citizens rejected the mayoral form of governance – except in Bristol.  Bristol 
citizens voted for the directly elected mayor model of governance by a margin of around 5,100 
votes.  From a turnout of 24%, 53% people voted in favour of a mayor, while 47% voted against. That 
Bristol bucked the national trend is something of a surprise, but not hugely so. The leadership of the 
city had long been regarded as unstable – there were five different leaders of the council in the 
period from 2000, some of them in office more than once.  The energetic ‘yes’ campaigners 
highlighted this instability, along with the perceived poor performance of the council, attributed in 
part to the history of poor relationships between political parties at the council.  
The 2012 Bristol mayoral election, much to the frustration of all the local political parties, was won 
by an independent candidate, George Ferguson. Ferguson, a well-known architect, was able to use 
his reputation for regeneration in the city to his advantage.  During Ferguson’s time in office, he 
introduced several policies with his own stamp, such as reducing the speed limit in the city to 
20mph, rolling out plans for controlling residential on-street parking, and advanced plans for an 
indoor arena. He also set up a ‘rainbow’ cabinet of senior councillors, with four parties represented 
on it. 
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The survey findings show a broad division between on the one hand those in the political realm, and 
on the other those in the public managerial and non-state leaders realm. In nearly all cases for the 
political realm, there are drops in levels of agreement between the surveys on the aspects of the 
two leadership models, a picture reversed in the responses of the other realms.  Given that 
respondents will necessarily answer in relation to their experiences in their realms, we regard this as 
evidence of depoliticisation, as the political realm becomes less influential, and the others become 
more so, especially in relation to the public managerial realm, as governing becomes more a process 
involving management.  We return to this discussion below, after presenting the results from the 
analysis of the two leadership models. 
 
Facilitative leadership model 
We now assess the performance of civic leadership in Bristol against the features of the facilitative 
leadership model using the results from table 2.  There is widespread agreement that, in relation to 
profile and decision-making the mayor brought about a remarkable lift in the level of visibility of city 
leadership, with survey results showing levels of agreement well above 90% for this variable, with 
each realm showing considerable increases in relation to previous results. This is one of the few 
variables in the survey where there is broad agreement between realms.  In contrast, for speed of 
decision-making, those in the public managerial and non-state leaders’ realms, were more likely to 
think that the new arrangements of city and council leadership were able to make quicker decisions.  
One business representative commented:  
 
Having an elected mayor, things move faster, not always in the right direction perhaps, but 
any decision is better than nothing. (Business Representative). 
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They also were more likely to think that mayoral governance underpinned a more accessible style of 
governing. Those in the political realm were more critical however: 
 
‘You can’t just walk in and see him’ according to one councillor.  
 
Perhaps some of the most striking results concern the role of parties. There is agreement across the 
three realms that parties had a considerably lesser role in decision-making after the introduction of a 
mayor than before. This is no surprise, especially as Bristol citizens elected an independent politician 
as mayor. On his first day in office Ferguson renamed the ‘Council House’, the headquarters of 
municipal government in the city, ‘City Hall’, in an attempt to symbolise a change in tone of 
governance.  He clearly saw himself as representing Bristol, unencumbered by party loyalties. 
Though those in the political realm tended not to agree, in the survey, with this view, there were 
large increases in the managerial and non-state leaders’ realms about the mayor keeping party 
politics in the background. Indeed, the Mayor formed a cross-party ‘rainbow cabinet’, the first for a 
major city in Britain, to provide advice to the Mayor.  This ‘rainbow cabinet’ (with all parties 
represented), pointed to a desire, on the part of the Mayor, to move to a consensual, in effect, 
apolitical or cross-party form of decision-making.  One elected member who sat in the cabinet 
revealingly commented: 
 
It works well. Members of cabinet have changed their behaviour. It is very collegial. You get 
personal relationships across parties. We are all focusing on what’s good for Bristol, not 
party politics. (Cabinet Member). 
 
Similar stark contrasts in the survey results relate to the ways in which the different realms of 
leadership viewed the impact of mayoral governance on agreement seeking. Few in the political 
realm considered that there was a broadly supported vision under mayoral governance, with fewer 
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still believing that mayoral leadership facilitated agreement between different interests. One long 
serving councillor offered this criticism of the mayoral model: 
 
Seventy elected councillors can stand up and say [to the mayor] “You’ve got it wrong” and 
legally he or she can turn round and say “I hear what you say but the law says I make the 
decisions”. And so one person can overturn the will of an elected council. That is not 
democracy. (Councillor). 
 
The survey responses of the other realms however, indicate a different perspective, with strong 
upward trends in both having a broadly supported vision, and being good at brokering agreements. 
Nevertheless, in relation to working in partnership and exercising influence there is less evidence of 
change. The political realm still displays much more negative perceptions of mayoral governance 
than the other two realms. However, for having good relations with partners, there was not much 
change in the non-state leaders realm, or the public managers realm. This might be partly explained 
by those who supported the mayor in driving change, perhaps in the face of opposition. One 
business representative said: 
 
We wanted someone who would not worry about what people thought of him and would 
love the city enough to do things that might not be popular. (Business Representative). 
 
Part of the case for introducing mayoral governance into the city had focused on the inability of the 
council to act in the face of opposition, or to ‘unblock the logjam’, as one non-state leader 
commented. From this point of view, too much consensus seeking and partnership working might 
hinder the achievement of particular goals. The mayor commented: 
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Being elected by the whole electorate creates a huge difference to my authority to do 
things. It also gives me the courage to make changes that otherwise, would be very difficult 
to make. (Mayor).  
 
In a similar vein, a councillor commented: 
 
Local government has a natural ability to delay decision-making… it is almost designed to 
slow things down. What the mayoral model says is “Let’s cut all this out. Let’s make things 
happen”. (Councillor) 
 
Here, though, there is also evidence suggesting that public managers feel that the mayoral model 
has expanded their authority and independence. One commented: 
The degree of clarity about values and priorities makes it easier to understand where to 
invest the team’s time and efforts… there is more freedom within the agenda that’s been 
set. (Council Officer). 
Another stated: 
From some points of view, it has been a very freeing and liberating experience. (Council 
Officer). 
For exercising influence over other actors, the discrepancies between the views of those in the 
political realm and the other realms are again apparent, with the political realm largely viewing the 
new arrangements as leading to a less influential city council leadership. In contrast, both other 
realms perceive the mayoral system as making central government more amenable to council 
influence, and tellingly, all realms see business interests being more open to persuasion from council 
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leadership, perhaps a result of the mayor having business interests in the city from his many years 
leading an influential architectural practice.  Also, one business representative described the council 
as being ‘more open to business’ than the previous regime. 
Overall, evidence to support an increased style of facilitative leadership is clearly evident from across 
sectors in relation to profile and decision-making, and low partisanship. The remaining elements of 
this model are disputed, with the political realm out of line with other realms, perhaps as the mayor 
was less inclined to seek the agreement of or to influence councillors. Our evidence lends support to 
the findings presented by Greasley and Stoker (2008) that in Bristol mayoral governance has 
strengthened facilitative leadership, but our analysis suggests that this general finding should be 
nuanced by recognising the importance of perspective and aspect of leadership analysed.  
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Table 2: Views on the facilitative model, by realm (% agree) 
 
 
Political realm Public managerial realm Non state leaders realm 
2012 2014 
% 
change 2012 2014 
% 
change 2012 2014 
% 
change 
Profile and decision-making 
The leader of the council/mayor has 
a high public profile 41.9  93.8  **+51.9 25.8  100.0  **+74.2 29.5  97.2  **+67.7 
The leadership of the council is 
capable of making quick decisions 55.8% 40.6% -15.2 3.2% 52.9% **+49.7 13.6% 58.3% **+44.7 
The leadership of the council is 
accessible 58.1  34.4  *-23.7 32.3  70.6  **+38.3 36.4  54.3  +17.9 
Low partisanship 
The leadership of the council keeps 
party politics in the background 
9.3% 15.6% +6.4 3.2% 58.8% **+55.6 11.4% 63.9% **+52.5 
Political parties dominate decision-
making 
61.9% 9.4% **-52.5 83.9% 12.1% **-71.8 86.0% 17.6% **-68.4 
Agreement seeking 
The leadership of the council has 
set a vision for the city that is 
broadly supported 60.5  18.8  **-41.7 29.0  50.0  *+21.0 13.6  44.4  **+30.8 
The leader/mayor is good at 
brokering agreement between 
different interests 53.5  9.7  **-43.8 38.7  60.6  *+21.9 16.7  57.6  **+40.9 
Working in partnership and exercising influence 
The council has good relations with 
partners 67.4  43.3  **-24.1 67.7  72.7  +4.0 45.2  54.5  +9.3 
The leader/mayor is good at 
supporting others to achieve their 
goals 37.2  10.0  **-27.2 19.4  54.6  **+35.2 19.0  51.5  **+32.5 
The current 
leadership 
of the 
council can 
influence 
the decision 
making of: 
Central government 28.6  9.7  *-18.9 13.3  43.8  **+30.5 14.6  42.4  **+27.8 
Other local public 
service providers 39.5  26.7  -12.8 33.3  69.7  **+36.4 43.9  57.6  +13.7 
Business interests 25.9  41.9  +16.0 13.3  54.5  **+41.2 19.5  39.4  +19.9 
   *Pearson chi-square results: Significant at 5% level (light grey);** significant at 1% level (dark grey). 
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Task-based leadership model  
We now turn to analysis of the task-based model and consider the results set out in table 3. With 
respect to maintaining the cohesion of the administration, as an independent elected on a platform 
critical of ‘party politics’, it is of little surprise that few councillors in the survey considered the 
mayor ensured the political parties maintained productive relations with each other. There was 
recognition that as an independent, it was easier for Ferguson to situate himself outside ‘the council’ 
and present himself as leader of the place.  Many non-executive councillors felt that the mayor was 
uninterested in councillor involvement, viewing the established processes of committees and 
councillor consultation as cumbersome and stifling. In contrast, actors in the public managerial 
realm saw mayoral governance improving relations with senior officers, with rises in positive 
responses in this respect, and in those relating to the new regime’s development of strategic policy 
direction.  One commented: 
There is a clearer line of sight re decision-making, and more clarity about where we are 
going. (Council Officer). 
For external representation, there was widespread agreement in the surveys that the mayor was 
visible in a way that the previous leader had not been. Council officers were especially effusive and 
mentioned greater access to central government. This was supported by a Whitehall civil servant, 
who commented: 
My impression is that Bristol has had more access as a result of having a mayor. I think the 
existence of the role – and the way the current mayor has gone about it – has made a 
difference to the way Bristol is viewed. (Civil Servant). 
This in turn was considered to have had consequences for the way that Bristol is perceived 
externally. The same civil servant stated: 
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It has given the officers a longer-term perspective, and they seem to be a lot more prepared 
to be innovative. In the past – probably over five years ago – my impression was that Bristol 
punched beneath its weight. Now it is doing interesting, radical things, and in some areas is a 
national leader. My impression is that this innovation has thrived because there is a longer 
term vision and more continuity in leadership. (Civil Servant). 
For ensuring task accomplishment, there was a collapse in support from the political realm in the 
survey.  An example of the way that councillors seem to have been disempowered in the running of 
the council comes in a damning report of council processes relating to financial reporting in the 
period covered by this project (Bundred, 2017). The report describes how councillors were not 
properly kept abreast of the worsening financial position of the council, and were effectively kept in 
the dark by officers. This led Bundred to ‘recommend that relevant officers be reminded of their 
responsibilities to backbench and Opposition Members’ (2017: 47). While this reduction in councillor 
involvement in important decision-making is not entirely attributable to mayoral governance - 
organisational culture has clearly played a part - this is a clear indication of the changing balance of 
power between members and officers.  
In sum, and with some exceptions, those in the political realm, who tended to feel that the former 
Cabinet plus Council model was an effective task based system, are critical of the mayoral model, 
not least because they feel they have been excluded from decision-making.  Conversely, other 
realms are more likely to offer positive responses on the mayoral model of leadership, particularly 
those in the public managerial realm. These findings also go some way to support Leach and 
Wilson’s (2002) contention that executive governance is likely to prioritise external representation. 
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Table 3: Views on the task-based model, by realm (% agree) 
 
Political realm Public managerial realm Non-state leaders realm 
2012 2014 
% 
change 2012 2014 
% 
change 2012 2014 
% 
change 
Maintaining the cohesion of the administration 
The leader/mayor is effective in 
maintaining relations between 
parties on the council 48.8  9.4  **-39.4 25.8  33.3  +7.5 14.3  39.4  *+25.1 
The leader/mayor is effective in 
cultivating good relations with 
senior officers 69.8  48.4  -21.4 45.2  78.8  **+33.6 21.4  48.5  *+27.1 
Developing strategic policy direction 
The leadership of the council has a 
vision for the city 67.4  56.3  -11.1 50.0  76.5  **+26.5 32.6  75.0  **+42.4 
The leadership of the council is 
effective in responding to the 
agendas of national government 46.3  32.3  -14.0 40.0  69.7  *+19.7 22.0  51.5  **+29.5 
The council executive is effective in 
setting policy direction 58.1  37.5  -20.6 51.6  63.6  +12.0 26.2  50.0  *+23.8 
Representing the authority in the external world 
The leadership of the council is 
effective in maintaining a positive 
image of the council in the media 39.0  30.0  -9.0 23.3  54.5  *+31.2 24.4  45.5  +21.1 
The leadership of the council is 
effective in representing the 
council in negotiations and 
decision-making arenas in the city 56.1  19.4  **-36.7 26.7  63.6  **+36.9 31.7  42.4  +10.7 
The leadership of the council is 
effective in representing the 
council in national and 
international arenas 51.2  45.2  -6.0 23.3  75.8  **+52.5 17.1  60.6  **+43.5 
Ensuring task accomplishment 
The leadership of the council is 
effective in ensuring the delivery of 
their election commitments 46.5  18.8  *-27.7 38.7  44.1  +5.4 11.4  52.8  **+41.4 
The council executive is effective in 
ensuring the delivery of council 
policy 48.8  15.6  **-33.2 35.5  57.6  +22.1 20.9  29.4  +8.5 
Pearson chi-square results: Significant at 5% level (light grey);** significant at 1% level (dark grey). 
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Conclusions 
Our first conclusion is that the introduction of the mayoral model in Bristol in 2012 led to the 
adoption of a more facilitative style of place-based leadership in comparison to the previous, 
relatively traditional, party political way of operating. This is evident in the survey responses relating 
to facilitative leadership and especially those from the public managerial and non-state leaders’ 
realms of leadership, and from qualitative evidence. We contend, therefore, that depoliticisation 
was apparent in the reform of urban governance in Bristol in the 2012-16 period because, despite 
the appearance of a more powerful, political figure on the urban political landscape, a more 
‘consensual mode of governance’ (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014: 5) was introduced.  
Yet this consensual mode of governance was not as ‘consensual’ as might at first appear, and was 
not perceived as such across the realms of civic leadership in the city.  Clearly, the shift to mayoral 
governance weakened the role of elected councillors in the governance of the city.  The move to, 
what some describe as ‘collaborative governance’ (Torfing and Ansell 2017) represented an 
alternative to the traditional task based party political way of governing localities of the last century 
or so.  Put bluntly, this case study research shows that elected councillors in Bristol were made 
largely impotent in relation to executive decision-making in the 2012-16 period.  Even councillors in 
the cabinet were only allowed to advise the elected mayor, and the mayor was, depending on the 
issue at hand, more than ready to ignore their advice. 
But our research findings are more nuanced than this first, relatively simple conclusion implies.  On 
the one hand, getting things done in the face of councillor resistance appears, to many, to be a 
positive feature of the mayoral system. The lessening of the role of councillors – effectively their 
depoliticisation - is a clear consequence of the way the mayoral model was implemented by Mayor 
Ferguson.  As mentioned earlier this process of depoliticisation was given momentum by the fact 
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that Ferguson was an independent politician. He was actively opposed to the traditional ways in 
which political power in the city was exercised and he made no secret of his desire to reduce the 
influence of political party groups in urban decision-making.  It is not just that Mayor Ferguson was 
an independent politician; additionally his personal leadership veered towards the ‘top-down’ style. 
In contrast to the dilution in influence of the political realm we can note the relative growth in 
power of the public managerial realm.  Our research shows that, in the 2012-16 period, council 
officers were given greater room for manoeuvre under mayoral guidance, empowering them to act 
in a more autonomous way than previously.  This shift of power to appointed officers is consistent 
with the notion of ‘urban managerialism’, as described by Pahl (1970).  The ‘politics’ did not 
disappear, rather, in line with the depoliticisation thesis, the political process continued to take place 
but in arenas one step removed from the involvement of many elected politicians. 
Beveridge and Koch urge the consideration of the ‘spectrum of agency’ (2017: 36) in the post 
political city. We argue that political agency is still very much possible in a context of depoliticisation, 
and it is clear that the directly elected mayor of any big city has substantial political agency.  Elected 
mayors are political leaders, and Mayor Ferguson took forward a range of policy initiatives.  In 2016 
Bristol citizens elected a new mayor, Marvin Rees, a Labour Party candidate, with a different style.  
The analysis presented here suggests that the individual who is directly elected as the mayor of a city 
has enormous scope, admittedly depending on their formal legislative powers, and the broader 
political and economic context, to shape the public policy agenda for their city.  The mayoral model 
makes a difference to the dynamics of depoliticisation, but so too does the individual elected to lead 
the city. It is not necessarily the case that the directly elected model of urban governance, on its 
own, automatically leads to a depoliticisation of urban governance.  Rather, the evidence from the 
Bristol case study suggests that the mayoral model changes the power dynamics of urban politics in 
a city and enables different possibilities for governance, and the way power balances shift within 
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these new arrangements depends, additionally, on the style of leadership exercised by the person 
elected as mayor within their institutional context. 
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